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Human-induced initiating events, also called Category B actions in human reliability
analysis, are operator actions that may lead directly to initiating events. Most conventional
probabilistic safety analyses typically assume that the frequency of initiating events also
includes the probability of human-induced initiating events. However, some regulatory
documents require Category B actions to be specifically analyzed and quantified in prob-
abilistic safety analysis.
An explicit modeling of Category B actions could also potentially lead to important
insights into human performance in terms of safety. However, there is no standard pro-
cedure to identify Category B actions. This paper describes a systematic procedure to
identify Category B actions for low power and shutdown conditions. The procedure in-
cludes several steps to determine operator actions that may lead to initiating events in the
low power and shutdown stages.
These steps are the selection of initiating events, the selection of systems or compo-
nents, the screening of unlikely operating actions, and the quantification of initiating
events. The procedure also provides the detailed instruction for each step, such as oper-
ator's action, information required, screening rules, and the outputs.
Finally, the applicability of the suggested approach is also investigated by application to
a plant example.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.r (J. Kim).
d under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
ich permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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Human induced-initiating events, also called Category B ac-
tions in human reliability analysis (HRA), are operator actions
thatmay lead directly to initiating events in probabilistic safety
assessment (PSA) [1]. Category C actions aremitigating actions
after an initiating event occurs, whereas CategoryA actions are
operator actionsdinmaintenance, testing, or calibrationdthat
can disable the actuation of safety systems after an initiating
event occurs. Most conventional PSAs typically assume that
the frequency of initiating events already includes human-
induced initiating events. Sometimes, human-induced
initiating events may not be dealt with in the full power PSA
because of their infrequent occurrence.
Category B actions need to be more strongly highlighted in
the low power and shutdown states. Many events initiated by
human actions have been reported to occur during low power
and shutdown [2]. A regulatory document in Switzerland
recommends Category B actions to be specifically analyzed
and quantified in the PSA [3]. In addition, a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission report, NUREG-1792, also stresses
that an explicit modeling of Category B actions could
potentially lead to important insights into human
performance in terms of safety [4]. However, no standard
procedure to identify and quantify Category B actions is
available for the low power and shutdown states.
According to the Operational Performance Information
System (OPIS) database [5], 21 events that were caused by
human error in Westinghouse-type plants in the low power
and shutdown condition have been reported to the Korean
regulator since 1991. Among these 21 events, 19 events
(about 90%) were caused by error of commission (EOC),
whereas only two events were due to error of omission. The
EOC figure is especially notable in the low power and
shutdown condition because a number of tasks including
lowering/raising power, maintenance, testing, and
calibration are carried out by the operators.
This paper suggests a procedure to identify and quantify
human-induced initiating events, i.e., Category B actions,
during the low power and shutdown states in nuclear power
plants (NPPs) using the Commission Error Search and
Assessment (CESA) method. With the modification of the
CESAmethod, the procedure includes several steps to identify
and quantify Category B actions, such as defining plant
operating state (POS), selecting types of major initiating
events, analyzing the operator actions, screening unlikely
operator actions, and quantifying operator actions. To inves-
tigate the feasibility of the approach, this paper also applies
the approach to an example plant, i.e., the Optimized Power
Reactor 1000 (OPR1000).EOC event TOP PSA sequences, 
using F-V data
Split fractions with similar 
contexts
Quantify
Step 3 :Identify specific 
scenarios
Step 4 : Characterize and quantify
Fig. 1 e Basic structure of Commission Error Search and
Assessment (CESA) method.2. Development of a procedure for
identifying Category B actions
2.1. CESA
The CESA method, developed by the Paul Scherrer Institute,
Switzerland, is suggested to identify potentially risk-signifi-
cant EOCs in the mitigating actions, also called Category Cactions [6,7]. The CESA’s basic concept is to analyze the key
actions required in the operating procedures. The method
consists of four steps required to investigate EOC events that
take place between human actions and procedures. Fig. 1
shows the basic structure of the CESA method.
The objective of Step 1 is to define and catalog possible
operator actions to be considered as potential causes of sys-
tem failure. As a final product of this step, a catalog of actions
that are required in procedural responses to plant scenarios is
established. This is done by reviewing the procedures that
guide the operators in their responses to plant trips and to the
initiating events. The result of Step 1 is a list of actions that
could be carried out as operator responses to plant trips and
the initiating events. The subsequent CESA search focuses on
the actions included in the catalog to determine the condi-
tions under which the performance of these actions is
inappropriate.
The aim of Step 2 is to define EOC events; these are defined
as operator actions that may contribute to failures of PSA top
events. A first screening is performed in this step by focusing
on the PSA top events, which have a Risk Achievement Worth
(RAW) value above a given threshold. The catalog of candidate
actions from Step 1 is compared against the fault trees for the
PSA top events.
Next, this set of EOC events is reduced by considering the
case-by-case basis of the consequences of contributing
candidate actions on the PSA top event as expressed by the
fault tree structure. The result of Step 2 is a more manageable
number of EOC events for which specific scenarios will be
subsequently identified. The level of screening is determined
by the RAW threshold used, which prioritizes EOC events.
Specific EOC scenarios are identified in Step 3; these sce-
narios are defined in terms of specific accident sequences. The
search is prioritized by analyzing the top PSA sequences, i.e.,
those with the largest contribution to the core damage fre-
quency (CDF; FusselleVesely importance). As in Step 2, a
threshold (e.g., the FusselleVesely importance or RAW) is
defined to determine the level of screening. The identified
accident sequences with potential EOC contributions are next
grouped into sequences with similar performance contexts.
Step 1. Define Plant Operating State 
(POS)
Step 2. Select initiating events
Step 3. Identify systems or 
components that can trigger  
major initiating events
Step 4. Identify human errors  
that cause system or 
component failures
Step 5. Screen out human error
Step 6. Quantify the operator error 
probabilities
Fig. 2 e Basic structure for proposed procedure.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 7e1 9 5 189The result of Step 3 is a set of scenario-specific EOC split
fractions in which each split fraction is an EOC event in a
specific accident sequence or a set of sequences with similar
performance conditions.
In Step 4, qualitative and quantitative analyses are per-
formed to determine the risk impact of the identified EOC
situations and to provide insights into reducing the risk con-
tributions of these EOCs. The risk impact of the EOC split
fractions then basically consists of the additional frequency of
the sequences (cut sets) calculated using the EOC split fraction
probability. This calculation accounts for the integration of
the EOC split fraction into the accident sequence context. In
many sequences, core damage only results when the EOC is
combined with subsequent hardware failures and operator
action failures.
In the quantification of an EOC split fraction, within the
EOC paths, dependencies have to be considered. Similarly,
dependency has to be analyzed in accident sequences in
which the EOC is combined with preceding or subsequent
operator action failures (these could be errors of omission and
EOCs).
2.2. Procedure for identifying Category B actions
This study suggests a procedure to identify Category B actions
during the low power and shutdown states using the CESA
method. In order to apply the CESAmethod for this purpose, it
is necessary to modify it, for several reasons. First, the CESA
method was originally intended to identify risk-important
EOCs of mitigating actions (i.e., Category C actions) in emer-
gency operating procedures. However, human-induced initi-
ating events are more often related to other procedures such
as general operating procedures, abnormal operating pro-
cedures (AOPs), and maintenance procedures. Second, the
importance measures of PSA (e.g., the FusselleVesely and
RAW values) are not available for prioritizing the EOCs that
introduce initiating events. The importance measure values
evaluate the importance of failures and human errors that are
modeled in the PSA. However, human errors that may intro-
duce initiating events are normally not included in the PSA
model. Thus, other criteria need to be developed to prioritize
or screen out Category B actions. In this light, this study sug-
gests amodification of the CESAmethod to identify Category B
actions in the low power and shutdown state. The procedure
consists of six steps, as shown in Fig. 2.
2.2.1. Step 1: Define POS
The first step defines the POS in the low power and shutdown
condition. POS is a discrete NPP condition during low power
and shutdown state; it is based on the reactor coolant system
parameters (e.g., pressure and temperature) and other phys-
ical plant conditions. POS is characterized in terms of time
after shutdown and the duration of the phases as estimated
from plant experience [8]. Even if there is no standard format,
POS can be separated into 15 states based on the reactor
coolant system parameters and the physical plant
conditions [9]. Plant configuration, operator actions, and
consequence of operator errors become different depending
on the POS. Using the same definition of POS as that used in
the PSA has advantages in terms of consistency.2.2.2. Step 2: Select initiating events
The second step is to select important initiating events for the
POSs of interest. The following information is used to select
the initiating events: (1) contribution of initiating events to the
CDF in the low power and shutdown PSA; (2) plant-specific
experience about human-induced initiating events; and (3)
survey of Category B actions reported from other similar NPPs.
The initiating events that have a large contribution to the
CDF are selected. The initiating events can be identified from
the PSA results. Plant-specific experiences are also useful
because they show vulnerabilities of the plant. If a plant has
any experiences of human-induced initiating events, the
initiating events are selected for further analysis. The expe-
riences from other NPPs need to be considered. Reported
events from similar types of plants or reference plants are
reviewed and selected if it is considered that it may happen in
the plant of interest. The result of this step is a list of the
important initiating events to be analyzed in the next step.
2.2.3. Step 3: Identify systems or components that can trigger
major initiating events
The third step identifies systems or components that may
trigger the initiating events selected in the previous step. The
information from AOPs and the piping and instrumentation
diagrams (P&IDs) can be used in this step. If the plant has an
AOP for an initiating event, the AOP may provide potential
causes of the event. For instance, the AOP for the Optimized
Power Reactor 1000 MW (OPR1000, Republic of Korea) directly
address three potential causes for the loss of shutdown cool-
ing system (SCS), i.e., loss of SCS pump, loss of flow line, or
loss of cooling capacity. P&IDs also provide useful information
to identify systems and components. This includes informa-
tion on connections or relations between systems or compo-
nents. The diagram helps provide a logical understanding of
the idea that a failure of the system or of a component can
lead to an initiating event. Using this information, this step
creates a list of systems or components whose failures could
cause an initiating event.
2.2.4. Step 4: identify human errors that cause system or
component failures
Step 4 identifies human errors that may lead to system or
component failures selected in Step 3. At first, operating
Table 2 e POS of modification results.
POS Description
1 Low power operation and
RX shutdown
2 Cooldown with SGs
3 Cooldown with SCS
4 Drain RCS to midloop
5 Midloop operation
6 Fill for refueling
7 Withdraw fuel
8 Drain RCS to maintenance
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 7e1 9 5190procedures (e.g., general operating procedures and system
operating procedures) are investigated to determine the op-
erator's actions as they are related to the systems or compo-
nents selected in the previous step. Then, this step identifies
EOCs in the action that can cause system or component fail-
ures. Table 1 provides examples of EOCs that can be
considered in this step. Finally, the result of this step is a list
of EOCs that can lead to the initiating events identified in
Step 2.
2.2.5. Step 5: screen out human error
This step eliminates EOCs thatmay have a very low frequency
of occurrence. This can reduce the effort spent on quantifying
those EOCs in the next step. Step 5 applies the screening
criteria to the EOCs resulting from the previous step. This
study suggests four criteria for the screening. (1) If there is a
compelling indication of operator error in the main control
room and if there is sufficient time to recover from the error
before it introduces an initiating event, the EOC can be
screened out. (2) If the next shift can detect an error by
checking the status of systems or components, and if this
checking activity is compulsory according to the procedures,
and there is sufficient time to recover from the error before it
introduces an initiating event, then the EOC can be elimi-
nated. (3) If an EOC can be automatically recovered from or
may not lead to an initiating event due to the plant configu-
ration in the POS (e.g., the systemor component is bypassed or
disabled in a specific POS), then the EOC can be eliminated
from further analysis. (4) If a specific aid (e.g., tags attached to
valves or components) is implemented to prevent operator
error and, as a result, the EOC is unlikely to occur, then the
EOC can be screened out.
2.2.6. Step 6: quantify the operator error probabilities
Step 6 estimates human error probabilities (HEPs) for the EOCs
selected in the previous step. Finally, HEP will be a part of the
frequency of the initiating event. This step follows the CESA
quantification method. The quantification of CESA consists of
six steps as follows: (1) define the EOC opportunity; (2) esti-
mate the reliability index under the nominal scenario context;
(3) determine the prior value of the total EOC probability; (4)
evaluate PSA impact; (5) identify adverse contexts and deter-
mine their probabilities; and (6) evaluate adverse contexts and
determine the final value of the total EOC probability.
The quantification method of CESA includes relatively
complicated steps, compared with other HRA methods. Thus,
the detailed explanation would be out of scope in this paper.
The details of the quantification method are provided by Reer
[10].Table 1 e Examples of errors of commission (EOCs).
Error type Specific effect
Action of wrong control Selection wrong control
Operate wrong direction
Communication Wrong command or information
(via voice or writing)
Action at wrong time Error of sequence
Error of timing3. Application
This paper applies the suggested approach to the identifica-
tion of human-induced initiating events during an outage
period of the OPR1000.3.1. Step 1: Develop the POS
The first step defines the POS of the OPR1000. This step may
use a definition of POS from the literature, such as NUREG/CR-
6144 [8] or IAEA-TECDOC-1144 [11]. For consistency of the PSA,
this study uses the same definition as that in the PSA for the
OPR1000, as shown in Table 2 [12]. Fifteen POSs are defined
in the PSA report. To demonstrate the feasibility of the
approach, a range from POS 3 (i.e., “Cooldown with
Shutdown Cooling System”) to POS 7 (i.e., “Withdraw Fuel”)
is chosen for further analysis.3.2. Step 2: Select the initiating event during low power
and shutdown state
Step 2 selects the important initiating events in the POS cho-
sen in Step 1. According to the PSA report for OPR1000, as
shown in Fig. 3, two initiating events (i.e., a loss of coolant
accident and a loss of shutdown cooling) contribute to > 90%
of CDFs.
This study also reviewed plant-specific experiences from
the KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School OPIS data-
base for the period of 1978 to 2013. Several human-induced
initiating events have been reported, such as loss of offsite
power, loss of coolant accident, and station blackout, as
shown in Table 3. In OPR1000 plants, there was one case of
loss of offsite power at Hanbit Unit 5. This study chooses the
loss of shutdown cooling as an initiating event because it
was identified to have the largest contribution to the CDF,9 Reload fuel
10 Drain RCS to Midloop after
reloading fuel
11 Midloop operation
12 Refill RCS completely
13 RCS heat-up with RCPs
14 RCS heat-up with SGs
15 RX startup and low power
operation
POS, plant operating state; RCPs, reactor coolant pumps; RCS,
reactor coolant system; RX, reactor; SCS, shutdown cooling system;
SG, steam generators.
Fig. 3 e Initiating event during low power and shutdown.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 7e1 9 5 191although there has been no plant-specific experience of this
type of error.
3.3. Step 3: Identify systems or components
This step identifies the systems or components that may
trigger the loss of shutdown cooling. The AOP of the OPR1000
indicate that the loss of SCS can be caused by three problems:
loss of the low pressure safety injection pump, loss of the flow
line, and loss of cooling capacity. The SCS shares pumps with
the low pressure safety injection system in the OPR1000. This
study also investigates the P&IDs to see the relationship be-
tween systems, which may influence the failure of SCS. Fig. 4Table 3 e Plant experience of initiating event during low powe
Event Description
LOCA SI signal actuated due to pressurizer safet
LOOP LOOP signal and EDG start signal occurred
EDG started automatically due to loss of v
Loss of offsite power occurred
SBO LOOP occurred and EDG failed to start
EDG, emergency diesel generator; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; LOOP, l
Fig. 4 e Simplified piping and instrumentation dshows a simplified P&ID to indicate the connections between
the SCS and the other systems. After reviewing the AOP and
P&IDs, four systems that may initiate the loss of shutdown
cooling are identified as follows: (1) Pressurizer; (2) Safety
Injection System; (3) Component Coolant Water System; and
(4) Chemical Volume and Control System.
3.4. Step 4: Identify potential human actions that can
cause system failure
This step identifies the operator actions and errors that may
trigger the failure of the systems selected in the previous step.
This study reviewed the general operating procedures, system
operating procedures, and AOPs. Then 16 operator actions
performed on the selected systems and the EOCs that may
lead to the failure of systems were identified. Table 4
summarizes the operator actions and EOCs that may initiate
the loss of shutdown cooling detailed in POSs 3e7.
3.5. Step 5: Screen out the selected actions
This step applies the screening criteria to reduce the number
of EOCs. Ten EOCs are eliminated from the 16 EOCs of the
previous step and the rest six remains. For instance, the action
“Perform rack-out of HPSI circuit breaker” is removed based
on the fourth criterion mentioned in section Step 5: screen out
human error because the operator must attach a tag to the
circuit break for this action. Thus, 10 EOCs are eliminated inr and shutdown state.
Date
y valve opening May 25, 2008 Kori-3
due to human error Apr 4, 2011 Kori-3
oltage for C-1E bus Dec 12, 2010 Hanbit-5
Jun 19, 2004Wolsong-2
Feb 9, 2012 Kori-1
oss of offsite power; SBO, station blackout.
iagram (P&ID) for shutdown cooling system.
Table 4 e Potential operator actions and EOCs in POSs 3e7.
Cause System or
component
Procedures (ID) Step/activity Operator action EOC type
Loss of pump SI Operating procedure (3005) 5.37.1 Request I&C team to
bypass ESFAS signal
Perform bypass signal Selection of wrong control
Operating procedure (3005) 5.37.2 HPSI Circuit Breaker
rack-out
Perform rack-out for specific component Selection of wrong pump owing to
miscommunication
Operating procedure (3005) 5.37.3 CSP Circuit Breaker
rack-out
Perform rack-out for specific component Selection of wrong pump owing to
miscommunication
System procedure (3441B) 6.1.6 Perform pump
start-up check
Perform vent activity Selection of wrong control
System procedure (3441B) 6.2.6 4) Perform pump
start-up check
Perform vent activity Selection of wrong control
CVCS Operating procedure(3006) 5.2.22 Control the level
of RCS using controller
Control the controller Operation of wrong direction
Loss of flow line SI Operating procedure (3005) 5.30 Bypass low pressure
of PZR signal
Bypass CPC trip function Error of timing
System procedure(3441B) 6.4 Change line for
purification
Open/close valve Error of sequence
CVCS Operating procedure (3005) 5.41.10 IA Cooling
source change
Open/close valve Selection of wrong control
Operating procedure(3005) 5.45.3 3) Let down flow
control using flow
controller
Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
Operating procedure(3005) 5.45.4 2) Let down flow
control using flow
controller
Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
System procedure (3441B) 6.3.1 4) Purification low
control using flow
controller
Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
PZR Operating procedure (3005) 5.42.1 PZR spray valve
open to reduce RCS
pressure
Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
Operating procedure (3005) 5.42.2 Adjust the
number of PZR heaters
Turn heater on/off Selection of wrong control
Operating procedure (3005) 5.45.3 1) PZR spray valve
open to reduce RCS
pressure
Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
Operating procedure (3005) 5.45.3 2) Adjust the
number of PZR heaters
Turn heater on/off Selection of wrong control
CPC, Core Protection Calculator; CSP, Containment Spray Pump; CVCS, Chemical Volume and Control System; EOC, error of commission; ESFAS, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System; HPSI,
High Pressure Safety Injection; I&C, Instrumentation & Control; IA, Instrument Air; PZR, pressurizer; RCS, reactor coolant system; SI, Safety Injection System.
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Table 5 e Eliminated EOCs in Step 5.
Cause System or
component
Procedures (ID) Step/activity Operator action Screening
criteria
Loss of pump SI Operating procedure (3005) 5.37.1 Request I&C team to bypass ESFAS signal Perform bypass signal 3
Operating procedure (3005) 5.37.2 HPSI Circuit Breaker rack-out Perform rack-out for specific component 4
Operating procedure (3005) 5.37.3 CSP Circuit Breaker rack-out Perform rack-out for specific component 4
CVCS Operating procedure (3006) 5.2.22 Control the level of RCS using controller Control the controller 1
Loss of flow line SI Operating procedure (3005) 5.30 Bypass low pressure of PZR signal Bypass CPC trip function 3
CVCS Operating procedure (3005) 5.41.10 IA Cooling source change Open/close valve 1
PZR Operating procedure (3005) 5.42.1 PZR spray valve open to reduce RCS pressure Adjust controller demand 1
Operating procedure (3005) 5.42.2 Adjust the number of PZR heaters Turn heater on/off 1
Operating procedure (3005) 5.45.3 1) PZR spray valve open to reduce RCS pressure Adjust controller demand 1
Operating procedure (3005) 5.45.3 2) Adjust the number of PZR heaters Turn heater on/off 1
CPC, Core Protection Calculator; CVCS, Chemical Volume and Control System; EOC, error of commission; ESFAS, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System; HPSI, High Pressure Safety Injection; IA,
Instrument Air; I&C, Instrumentation & Control; PZR, pressurizer; RCS, reactor coolant system SI, Safety Injection System.
Table 6 e Selected EOCs in Step 5.
Major Accident System or
component
Procedures Step/activity Operator action EOC type
Loss of pump SI System procedure (3441B) 6.1.6 Perform pump start-up check Perform vent activity Selection of wrong control
SI System procedure (3441B) 6.2.6 4) Perform pump start-up check Perform vent activity Selection of wrong control
Loss of flow line SI System procedure (3441B) 6.4 Change line for purification Open/close valve Error of sequence
CVCS Operating procedure (3005) 5.45.3 3) Let down flow control using flow controller Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
CVCS Operating procedure (3005) 5.45.4 2) Let down flow control using flow controller Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
CVCS System procedure (3441B) 6.3.1 4) Purification flow control using flow controller Adjust controller demand Operation of wrong direction
CVCS, Chemical Volume and Control System; EOC, error of commission; RCS, reactor coolant system; SI, Safety Injection System.
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Table 7 e HEPs of six EOCs.
Cause Step/Activity EOCs HEPs
(/demand)
Frequency
(/year)
Loss of pump 6.1.6 Perform pump start-up check Selection of wrong control 3  103 2  103
6.2.6 4) Perform pump start-up check Selection of wrong control 3  103 2  103
Loss of flow line 6.4 Change line for purification Error of sequence 4  102 2.67  102
5.45.3 3) Let down flow control using flow controller Operation of wrong direction 3  104 2  104
5.45.4 2) Let down flow control using flow controller Operation of wrong direction 3  104 2  104
6.3.1 4) Purification flow control using flow controller Operation of wrong direction 4  102 2.67  102
Total (POSs 3e7) 8.7  102 5.78  102
EOCs, errors of commission; HEPs, human error probabilities; POS, plant operating state.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 7e1 9 5194this step. Table 5 shows the eliminated EOCs and the criteria
applied. The result of Step 5 is the identification of the final
six EOCs that will be quantified in the next step as shown in
Table 6.3.6. Step 6: Quantify HEPs
This step estimates the HEP for the six EOCs using the CESA
quantification method. The CESA quantification method
mainly consists of two stages [10]. The first stage is to
evaluate nominal scenario conditions and quantify the HEP
under the given conditions. The estimated HEP is multiplied
with the recovery factor for quantification. However,
recovery actions are not taken into account in this study
because these EOCs immediately initiate the loss of
shutdown cooling. Then, the second stage comprises the
search for adverse contexts (i.e., conditions worse than
nominal) and the estimation of the final HEPs. The HEPs of
the six EOCs during POSs 3e7 are calculated as shown in
Table 7. The HEPs are also converted to the annual
frequencies for use as an initiating event frequency. It is
assumed that the overhaul is carried out every 18 months
and the action is taken once per overhaul.4. Discussion
The PSA of the OPR1000 assigns 1.89  106 as the frequency
of loss of shutdown cooling for POSs 3e7. The approach of
this study estimates the probability of human errors that
may initiate a loss of shutdown cooling to be 5.78  102 for
the same period. Two possible reasons can be considered for
the reason for the probability of human-induced events being
higher than the frequency of the initiating event used in the
PSA. One is that the current PSA may not sufficiently take
into account the probability of human-induced initiating
events in the low power and shutdown condition. The
operating experiences from the OPIS and from this study
commonly indicate that human induced-initiating events in
the low power and shutdown condition are more probable
than the estimate given in the PSA. However, the current PSA
simply assumes that the frequency of initiating events in-
cludes cases caused by human error. The other reason for
this discrepancy of probability is that the CESA quantification
method may overestimate the probability of human error forCategory B actions. Similar to other HRA methods, the CESA
quantification method focuses on Category C actions, i.e.,
mitigating actions. In the analysis of Category C actions,
many HRAs divide operator actions into diagnosis and
execution, and quantify these two types of actions sepa-
rately. However, diagnosis action may be trivial or eliminated
because there are no abnormal indications in the low power
and shutdown condition. Thus, the error probability of the
diagnosis step needs to be excluded in the analysis of Cate-
gory B actions. Another reason for the overestimation is that
the CESA method has no way to credit actions performed by
independent checkers. To reduce HEPs, the OPR1000 allocates
an independent checker who observes and monitors impor-
tant operator actions simultaneously. These checkers may
detect operator errors before they are committed. This in-
dependent checking is different from recovery, which hap-
pens after a human error, which is credited by most HRA
approaches. If this independent checking is credited in the
analysis, the error probability of Category B actions would
seem to decrease.
In conclusion, this paper suggests an approach based on
the CESAmethod to identify human-induced initiating events
during the low power and shutdown state. This approach can
be used to systematically identify Category B actions. This
paper also applied the approach to identify a loss of shutdown
cooling accident caused by human error at POSs 3e7 for
OPR1000. The final probability of initiating events can be used
to update the current frequency of initiating events during low
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